“Think before you act” is an aphorism many are taught in their childhood. As it suggests, to pause, reflect, and act is to consider the weight of your actions and how they may affect others; it asks of you to be responsible and exercise sincerity. But as much as the aphorism holds, I have found that its essence becomes lost as we get older; its meaning, futile. The older we get, the more we identify ourselves with groups. Being in a group is convenient because it establishes an identity for us without the process of cultivating one ourselves. However, establishing an identity can paradoxically cultivate the loss of identity, stripping our natural liberties for acclimation. Suddenly, our actions start to escape our intentions; we adhere to morals or virtues we otherwise wouldn’t agree to; we lose ourselves while trying to belong. Autonomy stops becoming a thing we chase, and starts becoming a thing we forget we ever had, all for the relief of having decisions made for us outside of our agency. This is dangerous because in a country where freedom is promised, autonomy isn’t, and that is a failure. I believe this failure shows up in myriad ways in our democracy’s politics, but ICE agents are among its clearest faces, executing policies none of them wrote, and few of them, perhaps, would defend alone.
What are we but actors in a society acclimating to environments that ask nothing of our own judgment? We disagree with laws and policies, yet our inaction remains manifest. We mold like globs of clay when the majority believes in things we wouldn’t—perhaps the ethos of one’s favorite celebrity would hold priority in many young people’s minds when considering their feelings on a human rights issue over their own discernment. To base our morals and virtues on the majority is, definitively, a submission of feeble thinking. For what is our conscience but a tool that can be used to perceive right from wrong, self from group, judgement from obedience, if it is not to be used at all? For ICE agents, one can only imagine the variance of their ethics. In an article posted by WIRED reporting on an ICE forum, one agent expressed how they’re “Ready to resign” and have “had enough stress” (Elliott). Evidently, one must also imagine that more ICE agents dislike their job than shown on the surface. What all of these elements point to is the means of thoughtless obedience and the tyranny of the majority.
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem pinpoints this discrepancy of obedience in Adolf Eichmann, the main organizer of the Holocaust during Nazi Germany—his task was to manage the deportation of millions of Jews to Nazi ghettos and concentration camps. In a time when genocide was lawful and discrimination against Jewish people justified, Arendt depicted Eichmann as a man who was led by “sheer thoughtlessness–something by no means identical with stupidity,” which subsequently “predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period” (288). What I found captivating is the notion that Arendt proposed of Eichmann, who, she declares, was a man who was not led by his own conscience, but by the legalization of unjust laws that “took place within a ‘legal order’”; she remarked on this feature as an “outstanding characteristic” of totalitarian states (290). In the context of the United States, it is certainly not a totalitarian country. Still, the mechanism of abiding by morally unjust laws remains relevant among its politicians, government agents, and perhaps even its own citizens. To watch injustice occur on our streets and simultaneously allow it to happen is wrong. But, as any consenting American citizen would say: if it is considered lawful, that must mean it is just, right?
Eichmann was, on several accounts, considered a normal citizen. A psychiatrist, from one of the half dozen licensed professionals who had examined him, described him as a man who was “more normal, at any rate, than I am” (Arendt 25). Further, in the examination, the doctors professed that he was actually a man who had “no case of insane hatred of Jews” and “never had anything whatever against Jews” (26). What is particularly fascinating is the robust evidence that supports the image of Eichmann as a man who was not driven by evil itself, but by the political machinery of the Nazi regime, which operated with an evil impetus. Eichmann’s thoughtlessness coupled with his blind adherence enabled him to do the unthinkable. His conscience had been subverted by evil, not with it. This profoundly underscores the relationship between one’s intentions and actions, showing how the line dissolves when thinking is absent from the equation. With this in mind, the manipulative essence of citizens’ actions under totalitarian government becomes copiously clear.
However, to frame this mechanism as feasible only under totalitarian authority would be disingenuous to the organizational structure of bureaucracies. Arendt argued that it is “perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy” to nourish and cultivate “functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery out of men, and thus to dehumanize them” (289). Therefore, we must conclude that Eichmann “acted fully within the framework of the kind of judgement required of him,” foregoing human judgment and morals and replacing it with an imposed framework of thought (293). This reveals the reality of many political actors in our government: policymakers, politicians, federal agents, public administrators, etc., all represent the machinery of bureaucracy. To become a cog in the machine is to become disillusioned with the reality of your actions simply because it is “your job,” and far too often do we see this epitomized in America’s politics. When the machinery of one’s job becomes their whole identity, we witness how this framework corrupts day-to-day lives. We see this in the example of Alex Pretti, who was shot multiple times by ICE agents in a matter of seconds; we see this in the mother of 3, Renee Nicole Good, who was shot while monitoring ICE during one of their patrols; we see this in the fatal death of Ruben Ray Martinez, who was shot by ICE while driving with his friend during spring break. All were American citizens.
Where Hannah Arendt diagnoses the problem, John Stuart Mill perhaps provides a solution. In his political essay On Liberty, Mill alludes to the idea of the tyranny of the majority, which he believes is “among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard” (8). He conceptualizes it as a “social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression” that functions with “extreme penalties,” perpetually “enslaving the soul itself” (8). Political officials, and even normal citizens, who continue to appeal to the majority become, as Mill suggests, trapped in the perennial imposition of society. In lieu of being a part of the majority, Mill proposes the harm principle, proclaiming that the “only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (13). Mill’s proposal succinctly defines the role that governments should play in our lives and in our own individuality. Therefore, if we are to be governed by a bureaucracy that intends to harm others, we should, by our own moral order, intervene and participate in civil disobedience for the sake of following our own moral conscience. As participatory citizens, our democracy demands we be an “active interference” when harmful injustice ensues (56). To be a participatory citizen is to recognize the importance of not always subordinating one’s morality to the state, and to go against the state when it acts immorally. Mill enunciates how one’s independence “is, of right, absolute” and how “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (13). For that reason, it is up to us to fight against state injustice. For if we don’t, we submit ourselves to morals that don’t reflect us, the individual, and therefore accept whatever is imposed upon us. Like a machine.
Beyond the harm principle, Mill makes a strong case for retaining individuality. He proclaims that the “only freedom which deserves the name” is the pursuit of “our own good” (Mill 13). Essentially, individuality should be expected in government, and one has a right to exercise it. Thus, it is also one’s right to express distaste for their current government and act against it if it goes against their own morality. Failing to do so would make you “justly accountable” for the state’s unjust actions and render you complicit. Mill explains, “A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction” (14). An individual who allows their government to perpetrate injustice is just as evil as the government itself. In a digitized age, we cannot expect an emotive reaction on Instagram to constitute “action.” To do so is to verify your allegiance to a movement, but not take part in what makes it tangible per se. Expressing disapproval is not action; acting upon your disapproval is. When injustice is observed, our individual morality demands we act against it. Not only does our own moral conscience depend on it, but the future of our democracy does too. To hold government actors, such as ICE agents, accountable is patriotic.
While Arendt and Mill both explore vastly different forms of government, with the former examining a totalitarian state and the latter a democratic republic, both authors seemingly acknowledge the dangers of losing individuality. Subsequently, both also recognize how conscience can be corrupted when individuality is absent. During the Holocaust, many Nazi soldiers were led to believe they were “involved in something historic, grandiose, unique,” an event that was worth submitting themselves wholly to (Arendt 105). They believed they were a part of a movement bigger than themselves, something they could never achieve individually. By submitting their individuality to a group movement, the soldiers diluted their conscience to adhere to whatever the Nazi regime ordered them to do. This framework of compliance is dangerous because it perpetually activates inactive thinking. Mill wrote that “Originality is a valuable element in human affairs,” and to lose the essence of originality–specifically in our individual thinking–is a moral loss (63). Further, “Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of,” and this assertion from Mill reinforces Arendt’s identified problem of thoughtlessness not only among Eichmann, but the entire Nazi party. The paradigm of originality relies on the individual to realize their worth and remove themselves from environments that strip it. This matters because individuality and originality work in tandem to free one’s conscience from the machinery of government. If all citizens could reason with their environment, government machinery would be harder to uphold.
Mill would agree with Arendt that individuality is essential to having a good government. However, their agreement falls short because they define individuality differently in relation to government. Arendt believes individuality is predicated on the faculties of a good government, whereas Mill believes individuality is a key component for achieving a good government. Arendt provides the tools for examining how a corrupted conscience can start—thoughtless obedience—and Mill provides the tools for exploring how a corrupted conscience can be mitigated—through the harm principle. In contemporary society, however, this is not enough. Mill would address ICE with the harm principle and claim it to be an effective model for lessening the magnitude of their actions, but I believe he ignores the realities of how a government actually functions. For a government cannot operate by asking each individual to personally weigh harm in every single case; it survives on general rules, applied uniformly, precisely because uniformity is what allows it to exist. So what about Arendt’s definition of individuality? It might work, but she too forgets that judgement requires more than the will to think. What it requires is an institution that is willing to make that thinking occur. She has shown us that this type of behavior can occur in any form of government, and how the perilous nature of thoughtless acceptance does not announce itself as evil, but as simple procedure. Fundamentally, both authors fall short in their definitions because they presuppose that individuals can recognize when their judgment is required.
A feasible solution to this issue of individuality can be the integration of a purposeful conscience in society. Far too often do we see governments–and even institutions–barking orders at their workers, but seldom offer them a space to consider the weight of their actions. This is by design, but this design rules out the possibility of one using their conscience altogether. One could argue that some institutions require this design more than others, which is certainly true, but to reject conscience as a whole creates a gap between the individual’s morals and their actions. One could also argue that an individual in an unjust institution may know that what they are doing is immoral, but continue to do their job. So perhaps it is not upon the individual nor the institution to solve this issue independently, but both parties to work and advocate for an active conscience. For an active conscience cannot solely rely on the individual to exercise itself, but also on the institution it participates in so as to do good. Compared to Arendt and Mill’s framework of conscience, this solution is practical because it allows individuals to make use of their own rationality while conscientiously recognizing their role in an institution. We cannot pretend that the individual and the institution are mutually exclusive. It is imperative that the two work together to enable an active conscience.
So, what does “think before you act” mean in 2026? On the surface level, it means to consider how your actions will affect others. Sentimentally, however, I believe Arendt and Mill have given it a different definition: to put your individuality and moral conscience over what is imposed on you, even if you may be in the minority. Mill gives credence to this definition in his essay, but Arendt proves the dangers of what a thoughtless citizen is capable of. With rampant ICE raids ravaging across America, consider your part in their operations. Injustice asks that we, as citizens of a country that constitutionalized freedom for all, resist it and shape it into justice. For if “resistance waits till life is reduced to nearly one uniform type,” the unordinary will become ordinary, and all objections to the majority will be considered “impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature” (Mill 72). Resistance does not wait for the right moment. Resistance begins when injustice begins, and we cannot assume that injustice will ever be absent from society. It will always exist. Henceforth, let individuality be the guiding force for all citizens in society to combat injustice with justice; imposition with conscience; and machinery with purpose.
Works Cited
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguin Classics, 2006.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays. Edited by Mark Philp and Frederick Rosen, Oxford UP, 2015.
Elliott, Vittoria. “Inside the ICE Forum Where Agents Complain About Their Jobs.” Wired, 4 Feb. 2026, www.wired.com/story/inside-the-ice-forum-where-agents-complain-about-their-jobs/.
Kim, Juliana. “‘No Peace’: Nearly a Year After Her Son’s Death, She Learned That ICE Was Responsible.” NPR, 15 Apr. 2026, www.npr.org/2026/04/15/nx-s1-5782114/ice-shooting-texas-ruben-ray-martinez-mother.
“Renee Nicole Good: Mother of 3 Who Loved to Sing and Write Poetry Shot and Killed by ICE in Minneapolis.” CNN, 8 Jan. 2026, www.cnn.com/2026/01/08/us/renee-nicole-good-minneapolis-ice-shooting-hnk.
Vinick, Gaby, et al. “A Minute-by-Minute Timeline of the Fatal Shooting of Alex Pretti Involving Federal Agents.” ABC News, 26 Jan. 2026, https://abcnews.com/Politics/minute-minute-timeline-fatal-shooting-alex-pretti-federal/story?id=129547199
